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Sustainability science emerged from the felt need to employ appropriate science and technology 
in the pursuit of sustainable development. The existing sustainability science agenda emphasizes the 
importance of using a systems approach, stressing the many interactions between natural and human 
systems. Despite its inertia and avowed purpose of being practical and feasible, however, sustainability 
science has yet to embrace the policy sciences. In pursuit of this objective, we first trace the history of 
thought of sustainable development, including its definition and operationalization.  
  Sustainable development encompasses sustainable growth and dynamically efficient development 
patterns.  Two promising approaches to sustainable growth are contrasted. Negative sustainability 
counsels policy makers to offset any decrease in natural capital with at least the same value of net 
investment in produced capital. This sustainability criterion cannot determine how and how much to 
conserve natural capital nor how much to build up human and productive capital. Indeed, there is 
ambiguity regarding what prices to use in summing the values of diverse capital assets.  To fill the void, 
we offer positive sustainability, which maximizes intertemporal welfare while incorporating system 
linkages, dynamic efficiency, and intertemporal equity. This provides a solid and operational framework 
for sustainable growth. In addition, sustainable development must include the lessons from development 
theory, including how optimal patterns of production, consumption, and trade change with standards of 
living.  
However, like Tolstoy’s unhappy families, there are many pathways to unsustainable 
development. We describe two broad causes of unsustainable growth – rent-seeking and preservationism. 
We also illustrate patterns of unsustainable development by drawing on lessons from the Philippines. 
While specialization is the engine of growth, fragmentation is the anchor. In addition to natural 
fragmentation from natural trade barriers in an island archipelago, policy and governance, driven by rent-
seeking, promote economic stagnation. Low economic growth in turn exacerbates population pressure and 
environmental degradation—the vicious circle of unsustainable development. We give particular attention 
to how a resource curse can exacerbate policy distortions and rent-seeking, and how the same 
phenomenon can be promulgated by foreign aid, foreign direct investments, remittances, and tourism.  
  For sustainable development not to be at odds with policy science, positive sustainability must be 
combined with projects and policies that promote dynamic comparative advantage and poverty reduction. 
We emphasize the facilitative role of government especially in transforming the vicious circle into a 
virtuous circle. 
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INTRODUCTION: SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Sustainability science emerged from the felt need to employ appropriate science and technology 
in the pursuit of sustainable development.  The publication of Our Common Future
a in 1987 by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED: the Brundtland 
Commission) placed research and development as an integral component of sustainable 
development strategies and has been espoused by a number of international scientific 
organizations that were formed in the 1980s (Clark and Dickson 2003). 
Because of its importance to the roots of sustainability science, we first trace the history 
of thought of sustainable development, including its definition and operationalization. Two 
promising approaches to sustainable growth are compared. Negative sustainability enjoins policy 
makers to conserve natural capital in accordance with dynamic efficiency and to invest in 
productive capital such that genuine investment is positive or at least zero. This sustainability 
criterion is called negative sustainability because it only provides guidance on what not to do. 
There are no policy principles to prescribe how and how much to conserve natural capital, nor 
how much to build up human and productive capital. Indeed there is ambiguity about what prices 
to use in summing the values of diverse capital assets.   
 While most scholars have focused on what should be ruled out in the name of sustainable 
development (negative sustainability), we put forward the idea of positive sustainability, which 
maximizes intertemporal welfare while incorporating interlinkages within the total environomy, 
dynamic efficiency, and intertemporal equity. This gets us to a solid and operational framework 
for sustainable growth. In addition, sustainable development must include lessons from 
traditional development studies, including how patterns of production, consumption, and trade 
change with the welfare of an economy's citizens. 
While specialization is the engine of growth, fragmentation is the anchor. In addition to 
natural fragmentation from natural trade barriers in an island archipelago, policy and governance, 
driven by rent-seeking, promote economic stagnation. Low economic growth in turn exacerbates 
population pressure and environmental degradation—the vicious circle of unsustainable 
development. We focus on how a resource curse can exacerbate policy distortions and rent-
seeking and how the same phenomenon can be promulgated by foreign aid, foreign direct 
                                                 
a Also referred in this chapter as the Brundtland Report. 3 
 
investments, remittances, and tourism. We further emphasize the facilitative role of the 
government and what it can do to transform the vicious circle into a virtuous circle. 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY OF THOUGHT 
As early as 1980, international bodies such as the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) 
endeavored to integrate economic and environmental management. However, the WCS fell short 
of being operational—it was unable to articulate either how poor economic policies would 
degrade the environment or how conservation might affect economic policies (Pearce, 
Markandya, and Barbier, 1989) Heightened concern for the environment was manifested when 
the United Nations (UN) formed the Brundtland Commission
b   in 1983 to examine the 
interrelationship between human activity and the environment, and its implications for economic 
and environmental policy. 
Before publication of the Bruntland report, Barbier (1987) represented sustainable 
development with a Venn diagram of three intersecting circles for biological, economic, and 
social systems (Figure 1). A unique set of human goals are assigned for each system. The 
overlapping area of the three circles corresponds to the overall objective of maximizing the goals 




The Brundtland Report (1987) successfully ensconced sustainability in the development 
arena and became the basis for an integrative approach to economic policy. The Commission 
defined sustainability as, “… development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” This rather vague 
definition has been the source of considerable contention. Indeed, a host of definitions has 
sprung up over the years: Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (1989) supply a gallery of definitions 
while Quiggin (1997) demonstrates several inconsistencies among alternative definitions. For 
sustainable development tourism alone, one can find over 300 definitions (Stabler and Goodall, 
1996). Ahmed (2009) noted that over 500 definitions of sustainable development exist. An 
International Environment Forum of the United Nations (UN) stated that there are one thousand 
                                                 
b Named after the Head of the Commission, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. 4 
 
definitions of sustainable development.
c Pezzey (1989) attempted to extract one single definition 
that could command the widest possible academic consent. Nearly a decade after, he gave up on 
his quest, noting that:   
 
“So I see little point in expanding the collection of fifty sustainability definitions 
which I made in 1989, to the five thousand definitions that one could readily find 
today.”  (Pezzey, 1997, p. 488) 
 
The burgeoning number of definitions is a consequence of an explosion of literature from 
economics, philosophy and other disciplines that followed immediately after the Brundtland 
Report, much of which was an attempt to specify what sustainable development meant for public 
policy. 
Just as the definitions and implications of sustainable development were proliferating 
along multiple lines, Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (1989) abandoned the Venn approach and 
turned the attention to articulating a vision of sustainable development that was consistent with 
both economics and the Report. In his background paper for the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED),
d   however, Munasinghe (1992, revised 1994) 
resurrected the Venn approach but turned it into a triangle encompassing three major objectives – 
economic, social, and environmental.
e The three vertices are further connected with double-sided 
arrows showing the interactions among domains, thus illustrating trade-offs and synergies. The 
picture
f is now known as the sustainable development triangle with its key elements and links.  
While politically popular, this portrayal was so grand that the scope includes income 
distribution, gender equity, culture, and a host of other political goals.
g The Venn diagram has 
                                                 
c See International Environment Forum (2009). 
d Held in Rio de Janeiro and commonly known as the Earth Summit, the conference resulted in: Agenda 21, the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 
e Munasinghe now advocates Sustainomics, “a transdisciplinary, integrative, comprehensive, balanced, heuristic and 
practical framework for making development more sustainable,” see Munasinghe (1994), also, 
<http://www.mindlanka.org/sustainomic.htm>. 
f Munasinghe’s “Sustainable Development Triangle,” Encyclopedia of the Earth, 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Sustainable_development_triangle  
g See e.g. Hardi and Zdan (1997). 5 
 
now evolved into 178 images
h reflecting both a diversity and inconsistency among concepts. 
Arguably, the Venn-diagram image is still the most popular. As in the original Barbier (1987) 
version, the three circles continue to represent three objectives: economic, environmental, and 
social. This version is non-operational, however, lacking separate but comprehensive 
performance indices of the three objectives.  
Moreover, in order for a strategy to be in the central section where all three circles 
intersect, the authors articulate minimum satisfactory performance levels for each. Three 
objectives, three performance indicators, and three constraints! Given that the Venn approach 
and most of the other images cannot be operationalized, how did they become so popular? 
Perhaps the very infeasibility in implementation is exactly the concept's appeal. When nothing is 
well-defined, anything goes. Any organization with a political agenda can readily turn the 
rhetoric of sustainable development to its own ends and not be constrained by transparency or 
accountability. 
In the field of economics, Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (1989) proposed what later 
became known as weak and strong sustainability. Strong sustainability prohibits any level of 
depletion of natural capital such as trees, water, or fish. The weak sustainability rule requires the 
summed value of produced and natural capital to remain constant or increase over time. A 
subsequent debate emerged over whether weak or strong sustainability was the best single 
criterion of sustainable development. Arrow et al. (2004) and others (e.g. Asheim, 1999; and 
Pezzey, 1997) have advocated a broadened form of the weak criterion for sustainable 
development—the requirement that the wealth of a society, including human-capital, knowledge-
capital, and natural-capital (as well as produced capital), does not decline over time. Others, 
including Barbier (2007), continue to contend that strong sustainability—non-depletion of 
essential stocks of renewable resources—may be appropriate, especially for forms of natural 
capital that are essential in the sense that produced capital or other resources are poor 
substitutes.
i 
Dasgupta and Mäler (1995, p. 2394) criticize strong sustainability on the grounds that it 
is a: 
                                                 
h See Mann (2009) on Visualising Sustainability. 
<http://computingforsustainability.wordpress.com/2009/03/15/visualising-sustainability/  > 
i This formulation implicitly acknowledges that applying strong sustainability to non-renewable resources would 
reduce the value of those resources to zero and leave countries at the mercy of their initial capital (Dasgupta and 
Mäler , 1995). 6 
 
“…category mistake, the mistake being to confuse the determinants of well-being 
(for example, the means of production) with the constituents of well-being (for 
example, health, welfare and freedoms)…” 
 
That is, by proposing strong sustainability as both a criterion and a constraint, the means are 
confounded with the ends, as opposed to deriving the rule from more fundamental objectives. As 
Dasgupta and Mäler (1995) conclude:  
 
“The point is not that sustainable development, even as it is defined by these 
authors, is an undesirable goal. It is that, thus defined, it has negligible 
information content. (We are not told, for example, what stock levels we ought to 
aim at). This is the price that has to be paid for talking in terms of grand 
strategies. The hard work comes when one is forced to do the ecology and the 
economics of the matter.” 
Regarding another formulation, that sustainable development requires both welfare and 
natural capital to be non-declining, Dasgupta and Mäler (1995, p. 2394) ask: “Two constraints? 
… [the formulation] offers no direct ethical argument for imposing either of the side 
constraints.” 
  At first blush, it would appear that even weak sustainability involves a category mistake 
in the sense that the requirement not to deplete the total capital stock is a means without a 
distinguishable  objective or criterion. Other authors have shown, however, that the weak 
sustainability rule (wherein total value of capital cannot decline) can indeed be derived from the 
sustainability  criterion – the mandate that the total welfare of all future generations not be 
diminished (Arrow et al., 2004). That is, the weak sustainability rule is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for achieving the sustainability criterion. However, this still leaves the problem that no 
fundamental ethical argument has been provided for the sustainability criterion in the first place. 
Moreover, the sustainability constraint can be extremely restrictive. Suppose that society has the 
choice between maintaining utility at subsistence levels forever or doubling utility and then 
decreasing it (due to a previous decline in total capital) by 10 percent. The dominant, but non-
monotonic, path is ruled out by the sustainability criterion. 7 
 
  Nonetheless, the sustainability criterion and the (implied) weak sustainability rule have 
become firmly ensconced in the environmental economics literature. Genuine investment
j is 
commonly applied to empirically determine whether specific countries satisfy the sustainability 
criterion or not (Arrow et al., 2004, Dasgupta 2007, Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). Genuine 
investment is the increase in the stock of capital assets – manufactured, human, and natural.
k The 
sustainability criterion is met if genuine investment is non-negative. Augmenting the measures 
employed by Hamilton and Clemens (1999), Arrow et al. (2004) showed that most low-per-
capita-income countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are unsustainable even though net 
investment and increases in human capital (education expenditure) are positive. On the other 
hand, China’s genuine investment is high, even amidst claims of heavy pollution and natural 
capital depletion, because of extremely high domestic net investment and human capital 
accumulation.  
By alerting countries that the total value of their capital accumulation is negative, the 
statistic provides a useful signal to examine the components more closely and formulate possible 
strategies to combat unsustainability. The criterion by itself, however, does not provide clear 
guidance on how much genuine investment should be increased nor how much its components 
should be changed. For that reason, the sustainability criterion can be classified as negative 
sustainability – it only tells us what not to do.  
   Hamilton and Clemens (1999, p. 351) maintain that the criterion naturally leads to a 
management of a country’s portfolio of natural, produced, and human capital.  
 
“More optimal natural resource extraction paths will, other things being equal, 
boost the value of genuine savings. The policy question for natural resource 
management is therefore: to what extent can stronger resource policies (royalty 
regimes, tenure) boost the genuine rate of saving.” 
 
As appealing as it sounds, the advice is misleading in two important ways. First, maximizing 
savings, genuine or otherwise, is inconsistent with maximizing welfare, which is given by green 
                                                 
j The term is synonymous with the “genuine savings” measure of Hamilton and Clemens (1999). 
k There are some variations on this theme: Dasgupta (2007) added institutions (including cultural coordinates) as 
part of an economy’s productive base on the assumption that better institutions allow the world’s poor to consume 
and invest more. 8 
 
net national product, GNNP = GS + C, where GS is genuine savings and C is aggregate 
consumption. Second, even maximizing GNNP is not an operational guideline without the 
correct shadow prices of the various forms of capital relative to consumption. The correct 
shadow prices can only be obtained by specifying the problem and then deriving the 
corresponding efficiency conditions. This is the objective of the following section.  
 
POSITIVE SUSTAINABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
One can note in the history of sustainable development thought, as sketched above, that 
somewhere along the line, attention was shifted away from development to the question of 
sustainable growth. We continue that focus in the present section and extend the framework to 
embody development in the subsequent section.  
  Positive sustainability posits sustainable growth as neither an objective nor a constraint.  
Rather, it is based on the central pillar of policy science, the maximization of a single 







i i i R d c A M B , subject to resource constraints 
regarding the amounts of produced capital and natural capital available.  B is the benefit from the 
joint consumption of material goods (M) and environmental amenities (A). Net benefit is 
obtained after deducting per unit extraction (c) and damage (d) cost associated with the 
utilization of the resource (R). Damage cost is necessarily included since using the resource may 
generate pollution, e.g. burning of coal contributes to the increase of greenhouse gas in the 
atmosphere. The sum of c and d is the total marginal cost of resource extraction.   
The total amount of produced capital and the amount of the natural resource consumed 
are arguments in the aggregate production function (e.g. Toman et al., 1995). Intergenerational 
equity is incorporated into the planner’s objective function by setting the planner’s pure rate of 
time preference equal to zero. Thus, maximization of intertemporal welfare incorporates 
interlinkages within the total economic and environmental system (environomy), dynamic 
efficiency, and intertemporal equity.  
  Two necessary conditions are required for positive sustainability: 
(1)  MEC MUC MC MB + + =  = MOC  
(2)  g NMPK η =  9 
 
The first is the so-called Hotelling condition for optimal resource extraction – extract an 
additional unit of the resource until the marginal benefit (MB) of using the resource is equal to 
the marginal cost (MC) plus the marginal user cost (MUC) plus the marginal externality cost 
(MEC). The sum of these three right hand variables is called marginal opportunity cost.
l  
The second condition is the Ramsey savings equation, which states that produced capital 
should be accumulated in any given period until its net marginal product (NMPK) declines to 
equal the growth rate (g) of consumption in that period times a measure of the planner’s aversion 
to intergenerational inequality (η), (Ramsey, 1928). Choosing the vectors of the two control 
variables,  M and R, which maximize present value, also determines the rest of the system. 
Capital formation is the residual aggregate output after subtracting depreciation, consumption, 
and total extraction costs () R c× . The change in the stock of the natural resource is  ( ) R A g − , 
where  () A g  is the natural growth of the resource (zero for a non-renewable) as a function of its 
own stock. Thus, consumption is balanced with conservation of amenities and savings. Natural 
capital conservation is balanced against accumulation of produced capital. Total value of 
consumption is balanced against total value of capital.
m 
 The  positive sustainability solution provides the dynamically efficient paths of 
consumption, investment, and natural capital depletion/accumulation. The contrivance of a 
sustainability constraint is unnecessary. All that is needed is to recognize the interdependence of 
the economy and the environment and to disallow intertemporal discrimination in the social 
welfare function (Heal, 2009). Having characterized the socially optimal path of the environomy, 
one can then proceed to determine conditions under which the optimal path satisfies the 
sustainability criterion or not (Anand and Sen, 1994). Critical determinants include initial 
conditions and model parameters, such as the substitutability between produced and natural 
capital. Moreover, adherence to the Hotelling and Ramsey conditions determines optimal 
management of the country’s aggregate produced capital and natural capital. This implies an 
optimal drawdown of non-renewable resources, an optimal drawdown or accumulation of 
                                                 
lThis “Pearce equation” is discussed further in Chapter 2 (this volume). The Pearce equation applies both to fund 
pollution, such as acid rain that is largely dispersed in a single period, and to stock pollution, such as greenhouse 
gases. Chapter 2 provides a modification of the Pearce equation, which applies to indirect externalities as well. 
m Optimal consumption increases monotonically and asymptotically to reach the “golden-rule” steady state level. 
For simplicity, population is held constant. In the case of constant population growth, the right hand side of equation 
2 becomes ηg + n, where n is the population growth rate and g becomes the growth rate of per capital consumption. 
See Roumasset and Endress (1996) and Endress et al. (2005) for further details and an extension to renewable 
resources and pollution. 10 
 
renewable resources, and an optimal accumulation of produced capital. As shown in Figure 2,
n 
these conditions move the environomy to the limits of the current frontier and move the frontier 
outward over time. Living standards, incorporating material consumption and environmental 
amenities, rise as the environomy approaches a “golden-rule” steady state. Win-win efficiency is 




  Implementation of win-win environmentalism requires modeling important interlinkages 
and dealing with political impediments to the implied public policies. Policy models of global 
warming, containing both climate change and the economic system, provide well developed – 
although not definitive – examples, inasmuch as they solve for specific policy prescriptions.  
Intergenerational equity can also be incorporated into this approach, as has become common in 
climate change economics (Heal, 2009). In ruling out discrimination against future generations 
and allowing for the possibility of renewable alternatives to petro-chemicals and other non-
renewable resources, efficient policies are compatible with increasing human welfare, eventually 
reaching a steady state (Ayong le Kama, 2001 and Endress et al., 2005). Sustainability does not 
require throwing out policy science that has evolved over the last quarter millennium. Rather, it 
represents an injunction to extend policy analysis to encompass both system interdependence and 
intergenerational equity. 
 
PATTERNS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
Sustainable growth literature, as discussed in the preceding section, presumes allocative 
efficiency and focuses on the dynamically optimal balance between produced capital (including 
human) and natural capital. By using aggregate capital and aggregate environmental amenities, 
the model abstracts from issues of composition across consumption goods and across 
environmental amenities. But no economy is without waste. Thus, there is a need to add 
principles governing efficient sectoral composition – each good is produced until its marginal 
benefit equals marginal cost, including any negative external effects of production.  
                                                 
n A variant of Figure 2 first appeared in Roumasset and Endress (2006). 11 
 
What is known about dynamically-efficient patterns of development?  Initially, 
specialization and capital accumulation (infrastructure, processing and mechanization) in the 
agriculture sector barely outstrip the dismal Malthusian forces of population pressure and 
diminishing labor productivity.  But population pressure also induces some innovation and 
specialization in the agricultural sector (Boserup, 1965, 1981). Aided by capital accumulation 
and fortune, these forces eventually lead to the emergence of industrialization. The possibilities 
for vertical and horizontal specialization are inherently more compact in industry (especially due 
to economies of assembly), and the external economies they afford eventually outstrip the 
negative Malthusian forces (Roumasset, 2008).
o Manufacturing and the surplus from agricultural 
development beget capital accumulation. Specialization and capital formation together increase 
the return to human capital formation, lowering fertility and augmenting the virtuous circle of 
industrial revolution (Lucas, 1993 and 2001). 
    Horizontal specialization of final products is further stimulated by vertical coordination 
provided by big-box retailers. Size of the market allows specialization of component varieties 
such that standardization is not needed.
p This process has no natural end point in manufacturing, 
inasmuch as further market growth allows further vertical specialization and horizontal 
specialization across intermediate products, tailored to specific end-products. A metaphor can be 
found in the new supermarket economics (Reardon and Timmer, 2007) wherein vertical 
coordination begets specialization. Farmers are increasingly linked to specific retailers by means 
of complex chains that transform farm products over space, time, and form. Thus, the process 
replaces the cumbersome and costly method of indirect coordination via inventories. Dedicated 
wholesalers coordinate specific farmers with specific retailers with appropriate procurement, 
quality, safety, and timing standards. This is important for land policy inasmuch as these 
arrangements confer transaction cost advantages on large farms (Roumasset, forthcoming).   
Changing relative factor endowments, technology, demand, and these organizational 
issues determine dynamic comparative advantage, i.e. the pattern of optimal specialization over 
time (Chenery, 1961). Moreover, specialization co-evolves with human capital (through learning 
by doing) and economic organization. These in turn create positive spillover effects (since 
                                                 
o As mentioned, these Boserup effects are already present in agricultural development and are augmented by vertical 
and horizontal specialization in agricultural contracting (Roumasset , 2007).   
p This approach ( Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1979) has been dubbed  “love of variety.” Each firm has  a 
monopoly on a particular variety of the product. 12 
 
knowledge is not entirely contained at the firm level) and further rounds of technological and 
institutional innovation. In short, specialization is the engine of growth. 
The composition of natural capital follows a natural resource Kuznets curve (NRKC). 
Resource depletion increases at the early stage of industrialization. As the comparative 
advantage shifts towards labor intensive manufactured goods and domestic resource prices 
increase, imports of natural resources increase and domestic resource extraction slows. For 
renewables, the reduction of stocks decreases or even reverses as conservation increases, e.g. 
replanting, bench terraces, fertilizer, and transition to renewable energy sources (Krautkraemer, 
1994 and Pender, 1998). These trends are augmented as the service sector grows relative to 
manufacturing, all resulting in a decline in the value of natural capital depletion, even as resource 
prices are increasing worldwide. In the case of China, combining the NRKC with the 
environmental Kuznets curve for most air pollutants yields the result that China's economic 
welfare, GNNP, is growing as fast or faster than its NNP, i.e. its net national product is 
uncorrected for natural capital depletion and environmental pollution (Roumasset, et al., 2007).  
  The final stage of structural transformation and specialization is often referred to as “de-
industrialization.” Developed countries and the Asian Tigers followed this path of structural 
transformation.
q   The flying geese
r   metaphor demonstrates how the co-evolution of 
industrialization is attained by macroeconomic patterns of specialization in the course of 
sustainable development. As wages increase in developed economies, other countries gain a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive, manufactured exports. In the East-Asian model, the 
lead goose was Japan, followed by the New Industrializing Economies (NIE) of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The third layer consists of Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia, with the Philippines and Vietnam trailing behind. The East-Asian miracle is 
characterized by capital intensification and human capital accumulation whereby network 




                                                 
q See Chenery and Syrquin (1975) for empirical evidence and Branson, Guerrero, and Gunter (1998) for a more 
recent study.  
r The flying geese paradigm describes how nations align similar to the V-formation of the geese in different stages of 
development (Akamatsu, 1962). 13 
 
WHAT CAN GO WRONG? 
In contrast to the positive pathway to sustainable growth, there are many pathways to 
unsustainable growth, much like Tolstoy’s (1878) unhappy families.
s The first of these, growth 
through excessive resource depletion and/or pollution as illustrated by the example of Indonesia 
(Repetto et al., 1989). From 1971 and 1984, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 
on average 7.1 percent a year. Because it does not account for depreciation, however, GDP is not 
reflective of a country’s real economic growth. Just as capital depreciation is subtracted from 
GDP to obtain net domestic product, so should the depletion of natural capital be depleted to 
obtain a more accurate measure of social welfare (Weitzman and Löfgren, 1997; Weitzman, 
2003). Indeed, Repetto et al. (1989) found that depreciation of petroleum, timber, and soil 
resources was valued at 4.5 percent of GDP from 1971-1984. 
Dynamic efficiency calls for extracting resources in accordance with the extended 
Hotelling rule for renewable resources (Stavins, et al., 2003 and Endress et al., 2005). Excess 
depletion of natural resources, as illustrated by the example of Indonesia, results from failing to 
align private incentives with social priorities, especially through inappropriate property rights, 
e.g. the ability of military units to exploit public forests and the nationalization of the oil business. 
Such institutions are often manifestations of "greedy growth," (northwest arrow of Figure 2) the 
proliferation of government entities, projects and regulatory policies to transfer rents from 
taxpayers to the "iron triangle" of politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests discussed below. 
Greedy growth in the arena of resource management is unsustainable in the sense that 
resources are wasted instead of being transformed into produced capital or conserved for future 
generations. Panayotou (1993) illustrated such unsustainable development projects with 
subsidized cattle ranching operations in Brazil.
t  The Superintendency for Development of 
Amazonia (SUDAM) was created to improve the economic development of the region. The well-
intentioned program provided certain corporations a tax credit scheme aimed at promoting 
livestock ranches in the Amazon. Overgrazing and ranch expansion into previously forested 
areas led to a lose-lose situation for the economy and the environment, as shown by the "greedy 
growth" arrow in Figure 2. When the ranches failed due to overgrazing and poor management, 
                                                 
sTolstoy’s (1878) novel, Anna Karenina, begins with, “All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is 
unhappy in its own way." 
t Cattle ranching is profitable in the Amazon due to relatively cheaper land prices and higher productivity (Volpi, 
2007). 14 
 
the economy suffered from commercial failure of the ranches and enormous fiscal costs, the 
latter amounting to more than $US1 billion between 1975 and 1986 (Volpi, 2007). But the failed 
ranches did not revert to forests. Rather, the overgrazed pasture grasses were overtaken by 
invasive cogongrass (imperata cylindrica) furthering soil erosion. 
Unfounded preservationism also results in a lose-lose situation for material consumption 
and the environment (southwest arrow of Figure 2), especially in developing countries. This 
inefficient policy alternative prevents sufficient capital formation from increasing wages, thus 
failing to provide a positive check on population growth. In the absence of jobs in the modern 
sector, the increased labor force seeks subsistence living in environmentally fragile areas. Thus, 
preservationism can lead to the unintended consequence of environmental degradation as well as 
decreasing standards of living (Roumasset and Endress, 1996). 
  Fragmentation has a stagnating effect on economic development. Wages may rise in 
favored enclaves without conferring gains in areas of underemployment and low wages. 
Specialization is limited by the extent of markets. Consumers and producers pay higher prices 
for goods and intermediate products. Three pervasive forms of fragmentation are geographic, 
economic, and political.
 u  
1)  Geographic fragmentation - Island economies are unfortunate to have these natural barriers 
to internal integration.   
2)  Economic fragmentation -  Protection by tariff and non-tariff barriers are distortions that pull 
resources into the protected enclave, distorting factor prices and artificially increasing the 
real exchange rate. These forces discriminate against agricultural exports and forward 
linkages into agricultural processing and packaging (e.g. Clarete and Roumasset, 1987).  
3)  Political fragmentation – Entrepreneurs are equal under the law but some are more equal 
than others. Politically influential individuals and companies can obtain special favors or 
circumvent the law while others are subjected to bureaucratic red tape, unnecessarily 
increasing the cost of doing business. 
 
Fragmentation has both static and dynamic effects. Like a system of internal tariffs, high 
transportation/transaction costs inhibit specialization and exchange, thus lowering national 
income. Specialization begets more specialization, due to learning-by-doing, human capital 
                                                 
u See Roumasset (2003) for a detailed elaboration. 15 
 
spillovers and growth externalities in general. Fragmentation impedes this process and begets 
stagnation instead. 
In addition to the natural fragmentation from natural trade barriers in an island 
archipelago, policy and governance driven by rent-seeking promote economic stagnation. A 
government needs extra-Smithian government powers afforded by their supposed facilitative role 
in coordinating investments beyond the basic institutions of property, contracts, and markets.  
However, these extra-Smithian government powers are easily abused. Facilitation via cozy 
arrangements between the government and industrial-financial conglomerates can lead to erosion 
of fiduciary accountability as in the East-Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the US-led world 
recession of 2007-2009. On the other hand, government "prizes" easily turn into mandates, 
subsidies, and "picking winners" with costly repercussions to economic growth and development 
(The Economist, 2009).  In short, even limited government powers allow for strategic coalition 
formation to extract unproductive rents from the economy – a phenomenon known as rent-
seeking. 
The potential for rent-seeking is greater in real-world economies whose governments are 
inevitably larger than the minimal state described above. Figure 3 illustrates rent-seeking with 
the famous iron triangle (Lowi, 1979; McConnell, 1966), representing alliances between 
politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests. Politicians form alliances with bureaucrats and 
special interest groups, who enjoy more sharply focused objectives and ease of organization 
(Olson 1982; and Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). Special interest groups benefit from lax 
regulations and special favors.  Politicians influence the legal, policy, and fiscal environment to 
confer rents in return for campaign contributions, favors, and other support. Bureaucrats 
implement rent-capturing agreements and broaden their power base. With these dynamics, the 
minority coalition readily tyrannizes the needs of the relatively poor majority. A primary 
example is protectionism, which confers rents to some industries but reduces total consumer and 
producer welfare (Corden, 1985). Protectionism decreases the price of foreign exchange, making 
imports cheaper and discriminating against exports. Since non-primary-good exports are a key 
engine of growth (World Bank, 1993), their inherent potential for specialization and learning-by-
doing is partially lost, thereby stifling economic development.
v 
 
                                                 




Nature’s abundance can ironically be another anti-development force – a phenomenon 
known as resource curse. This term is commonly attributed to countries with large endowments 
of natural resources, such as oil and gas, whose economic development and governance have 
lagged behind less endowed countries (Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 2001; Auty 1993, 1990). 
Economies suffering from a resource curse are said to have contracted the “Dutch disease”
 w. 
The theoretical development of the Dutch disease phenomenon is formalized in the classic 
papers of Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984). 
  
Two curses could arise from having abundant natural resources:   
 
1.  Dutch Disease Mechanics: Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate -The first curse results 
from real exchange rate appreciation, which lowers the relative price received by other 
exportables. The core model
x  explains how an intersectoral reallocation of resources is 
induced by the relative price change due to a boom in an extractable resource.
y A discovery 
(boom) of natural resource causes a contraction of other exportables such as the 
manufacturing sector. Resources are pulled out from manufacturing sector into mining the 
newly discovered resource. At the same time, income generated from the booming resource 
sector is spent on consumption of non-traded goods. Both effects go in the same direction, 
                                                 
w The term first appeared in November, 1977 issue of The Economist. It was used to describe the decline of the 
Netherland’s manufacturing industry after they discovered natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s. 
x The model has two sectors: non-traded sector and traded sector. Non-traded sectors produce goods that face high 
transport cost and typically include production of food and services for local use. A discovery of a resource, divides 
the traded sector into booming traded sector and lagging traded sector. The contraction of the manufacturing 
(lagging) sector is explained by the spending and resource movement effect. Resource movement effect involves the 
pulling away of factors of production from both the lagging manufacturing and the non-traded sector into the 
booming (resource) traded sector. This leads to a decline in the output of the manufacturing sector causing a direct 
de-industrialization. At the initial exchange rate, demand for non-traded goods rises and a real exchange rate 
appreciation is needed to eliminate the excess demand.  This, in turn, exacerbates the reduction in the output of the 
manufacturing sector – an indirect de-industrialization. Spending effect occurs when income generated from the 
booming traded (natural resource) sector is spent on consumption of non-traded goods, thereby exerting upward 
pressure on the price of non-traded outputs. Yet again, demand for traded goods increases further requiring a real 
exchange rate appreciation to restore equilibrium. Hence, the indirect de-industrialization arising from resource 
movement effect is intensified. 
y Corden and Neary (1982) observed that the booming sector is often of an extractive kind, e.g. the minerals in 
Australia, natural gas in Netherlands, and oil in the United Kingdom. 17 
 
increasing the real exchange rate and contracting manufactured exports.
z The appreciation of 
the real exchange rate implies an increase in the opportunity cost in the production of traded 
goods thereby eroding the competitiveness of the manufactured exports.
aa 
 
Exchange rate appreciation per se, however, is not a “disease” but an economy’s 
statically efficient response to changing relative prices. Due to the resource discovery or increase 
in world price, the economy’s comparative advantage shifts in favor of “production” of the 
booming traded sector in accordance with specialization for mutual gain.  Resource exports earn 
foreign exchange for imports more cheaply thereby driving out manufactured exports. 
But static efficiency is not everything. Since future prices do not exist for most goods and 
services, a static market equilibrium fails to achieve dynamic efficiency. If the lagging sector has 
more potential growth externalities than the booming sector, growth is negatively impacted by 
the boom. Recall that the engine of growth in the East-Asian Miracle countries was 
manufactured exports with their abundant and never-ending possibilities for continuing vertical 
and horizontal specialization and learning-by-doing. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector is a 
source of forward and backward linkages that generates production externalities (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995). But the resource boom discriminates against manufactured exports, thus putting 
the brakes on the engine.  
  
2.  The Returns to Rent-Seeking in Resource-Rich Economies - The second curse is the more 
virulent strain of the Dutch disease, directly unproductive rent-seeking (Bhagwati et al., 
1998). The political economy in resource-rich countries exacerbates the difficulty of 
sustaining growth (Corden, 1984 and 1982; and Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007). The 
more there is inherent resource wealth, the higher the returns to lobbying, the greater the 
lobbying, and the greater the resulting policy distortions. Corden (1984) gives the example of 
industrialists adversely impacted by the appreciation of the real exchange rate increasing 
their lobbying effort for tariff and non-tariff protection. Protectionism is said to be the most 
                                                 
z Corden and Neary (1982), Appendix 1, also show that there is an ambiguous effect on the output of the non-traded 
sector depending on whether the resource movement or spending effect dominates. 
aa Empirical support is mixed. Sachs and Warner (1995) and Auty (1990) find a negative correlation between 
resource abundance and economic growth.  See also survey by Nelson and Behar (2008) and the references cited 
therein. On the other hand, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) find that abundance positively affects growth. The 
ambiguity is not surprising because of the endogeneity inherent in the phenomena of interest and the difficulty in 
estimating a full set of structural equations. 18 
 
common form of rent-seeking because industrialists are already well-organized to lobby, and 
their export ox has been gored by the falling price of foreign exchange (Olson, 1982). The 
lagging sector (other exportables) is hit by a double whammy – both the resource 
discovery/boom and protectionism lower the value of the foreign exchange that exports earn. 
 
  The preceding discussion focuses on natural resource abundance/boom as the source of a 
curse. Subsequent studies extended the curse to other sources. Palma (2008) investigated how the 
expansion of tourism
bb in Greece, Cyprus, and Malta and the “export” of financial services in 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Hong Kong have also increased the exchange rates in these 
countries. Using cross-country comparisons, Rajan and Subramanian (2006) examined foreign 
aid as a similar curse. Paldam (1997) studies the adverse impact of grants from Denmark on the 
Greenland economy. Generally, any exogenous development that brings foreign exchange 
earnings into the country will have adverse affects on the “lagging sector” whose exports earn a 
lower price of foreign exchange. If the lagging sector is an engine of growth, such as 
manufactured exports, there may be a negative effect on economic development. If the 
exogenous boom increases the rate of return to rent-seeking, there will be an additional negative 
effect on development. Whether these negative effects outweigh the original positive effects of 
the boom has not been predicted by theory nor demonstrated unambiguously through empirical 
studies. 
 
ALL THAT CURSES IS NOT GOLD: A PHILIPPINE ILLUSTRATION 
The Philippines has been called a historical underachiever (Briones, 2009), laggard among flying 
geese (Intal and Basilio, 1998), and stray cat amongst economic tigers (Vos and Yap, 1996). In 
this section, we illustrate particular patterns of unsustainable development by drawing on lessons 
from the Philippines with the overall message that rent-seeking deepens fragmentation and 
economic stagnation.  
Lucas (1993) compares the Philippines with South Korea as an illustration of 
opportunities lost. In the year 1960, the Philippines was at par with Korea in terms of GDP per 
capita, GDP composition, population, and even exceeded the latter in literacy rates. The 
country’s human capital in terms of educational attainment was very high.  The civil, judiciary 
                                                 
bbSee Copeland (1991) for a formalization of tourism and deindustrialization. 19 
 
and legal institutions are also relatively well established. However, contrary to expectations, the 
country’s development has been substandard and has veered away from the stylized pattern of 
structural transformation.  Low investments in R&D, rural infrastructure, and detrimental 
government policies were among the problems. 
From the 1950s to the early 1980s, protectionism and import-substitution led to 
premature and distorted patterns of industrialization (Bautista, Power and associates, 1979; and 
Clarete and Roumasset, 1987). As opposed to the structural transformation of its neighbors, 
particularly the Four Asian Tigers, the Philippines largely skipped the primary engine of growth 
– manufacturing for export. While the Philippines’ growth has been restrained, Korea’s 
accelerated. Lucas (1993) refers to this continuing transformation of Korea as a miracle; similar 
to what transpired in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The Tigers pursued an export-driven 
model of economic development. The Philippines, meanwhile, followed the import-substituting 
industrialization strategy. After an initial spurt of finishing-stage import substitution, 
industrialization stagnated (Power and Sicat, 1971). 
There have been ups and downs in Philippine economic growth in the 1990s and the 
current decade. Despite some years of high growth performance, total investment (public and 
private) has been mostly in decline, especially after the Asian crisis in 1997.  Among other 
reasons, Bocchi (2008) suggested that the fast-growing service sectors (electronics assembly, 
voice-based business process outsourcing (BPO), and information and communications 
technology) remained profitable based on initial investments. Neither backward nor forward 
integration was forthcoming, nor increasing rounds of specialization. Since many of these 
services, such as call centers, are exports, they also raise the exchange rate, similar to a resource 
boom. 
Rapid population growth has exacerbated the lackluster performance of the Philippine 
economy (Mapa and Balisacan 2004; Herrin and Pernia, 2003). In the 1960s, the Philippine 
population was well within Asian standards at 3 percent. However, while neighboring South 
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia successfully slowed down population growth to an average of 
0.5-1.3 percent, the Philippine population is still growing at 2.1 percent in the current decade
cc. 
                                                 
cc Numerical exercise in Mapa and Balisacan (2004) showed that had the Philippines followed the population 
trajectory of Thailand from 1975 to 2000, additional increase in income per capita would have been at least 0.76% 
per year or a cumulative increase of 22%. See also Alonzo, et al. (2004) for comparison of Philippines, Indonesia, 
and Thailand’s population dynamics and its impact on poverty reduction. 20 
 
As a consequence, the Philippines missed the demographic bonus enjoyed by its neighbors 
(Herrin and Pernia, 2003). A high level of population coupled with low investment translates to 
declining labor productivity throughout the economy. This implies mediocre growth of human 
capital, high unemployment, and the so-called brain drain problems. A national consensus on the 
importance of population management has remained elusive.  
Moreover, the country’s capacity to facilitate a high impact of economic growth on 
poverty reduction has been comparatively weak vis-à-vis its Southeast Asian neighbors, even 
after accounting for differences in the level of growth that occurred (Balisacan, 2007). Poverty in 
the country remains a rural phenomenon with three quarters of the poor still residing in rural 
areas and dependent on agriculture. Poverty remains stubbornly high (at 11% in 2007), and the 
reduction of poverty and malnutrition is slow relative to other Asian countries.  
As an island economy, the Philippines has natural barriers to internal integration.  These 
are exacerbated by inadequate transportation infrastructure and misguided transport regulations, 
especially shipping (ADB, 2007, Balisacan et al., 2008).  As a result of these factors, the growth-
enhancing effects of trade liberalization are conferred disproportionately to port cities and their 
environs (e.g. Metro Manila, Cebu, and Davao).  Producers in rural areas are sheltered from 
international competition to the detriment of consumers and wage earners.  
In addition to geographic fragmentation, economic and political fragmentations are also 
pervasive. Economic fragmentation is manifested by the protection afforded to agriculture, 
services, and some manufacturing (e.g. steel and some petrochemicals). As a result, the 
agricultural sector remains inward looking and insulated from productivity-enhancing 
competition. Political fragmentation is also widespread. Even as trade barriers and bureaucratic 
red tape unnecessarily increase the cost of light manufacturing, agricultural 
processing/packaging, and production for export, politically influential entrepreneurs are able 
obtain exemptions or easy passage through the barriers. For example, even though the poultry 
lobby has managed to use the WTO apparatus to protect themselves from importation of low 
market-valued chicken parts, McDonalds has succeeded in exempting themselves. Similarly, 
Coca-Cola and other large companies have managed to secure low-cost sugar, even as potential 
small-scale candy makers and canned fruit manufacturers are unable to access the same benefit.  
While Monsanto and Cargill may be able to accelerate the Bureau of Plant and Industry (BPI) 
quarantine procedures and other restrictions on importing seeds, farmers who want to experiment 21 
 
with new varieties would face great difficulty in doing so (Roumasset, 2003; David, et al., 2009). 
Similarly, implementation of land reform can be delayed or avoided altogether through political 
influence.   
The Philippine experience also exemplifies how rent-seeking can induce other 
inefficiencies as well. Large conglomerates were able to raise prices and deter entry through 
political connections (e.g. agricultural commodity, most notably rice and sugar, transport 
services, electricity, and cement in the 1990s). Some of these were critical inputs to production. 
The white-elephant convention and “cultural” centers,
dd the mothballed Bataan Nuclear Power 
Plant,
ee and the mercantilistic structuring of agricultural and cement industries
ff further exemplify 
the formidable presence of rent- seeking. Other examples are the long-standing NFA rice 
monopoly,
gg  the exemption of the sugar industry from land reform and WTO provisions, 
government offices being controlled by political appointees, and barriers that increase the cost of 
doing business (e.g. permits). Other recent examples include the NAIA Terminal III fiasco
hh and 
the controversy on the Philippine National Broadband Network.
ii  Moreover,  governance 
indicators showed that the country fared comparatively poorly among countries with similar per 
capita GDP levels (ADB, 2007). It garnered the lowest score on control of corruption and 
political stability since 1996 and on rule-of-law since 2002. Furthermore, the county lost 
momentum in controlling corruption compared with Vietnam, which has been able to better 
manage corruption, and Indonesia, which is poised to overtake the Philippines in the rankings. 
As reviewed in a previous section, fragmentation and rent-seeking can be exacerbated by 
a resource curse. In what follows, we use the Philippine case to explore how a similar curse can 
also be promulgated by transfers, especially foreign aid, foreign direct investments (FDIs), and 
service-sector activities such as BPO and remittances.  
Many activities can be cited that increase the supply of foreign exchange and lower its 
price (equivalently increasing the exchange rate). In the 1970s, the Philippines suffered from 
exchange rate appreciation due to the large increase in foreign borrowings used to finance its 
                                                 
dd See e.g. Lonely Planet Review (2009.)  
ee See e.g. Agence France-Pessse (2007) and  Olea (2009).  
ff See e.g. Clarete and Roumasset (1987). 
gg See e.g. Roumasset (2000). 
hh See e.g. Liongson (2007).  
ii See e.g. Fabella and de Dios (2007) and Oliva (2007a,b,c). 22 
 
trade deficit.
jj The upsurge of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the 1990s had a similar effect. 
Long-term capital inflows have been on the rise
kk after the passage of the Foreign Investment 
Act in 1991.
ll  The policy of deregulation and privatization in the service sectors (e.g. water, 
communications, and transport), especially during 1992-1998, attracted FDIs away from the 
traditional manufacturing into the services sector. More recently, efforts are made to attract FDI 
in BPO.
mm  The steady increase of remittances is likely to have the same effect of increasing 
exchange rate. Remittances accounted for an average of 13 percent of GDP during 2003-2007 
(WDI, 2008). 
As noted in the preceding section, any activity that brings in foreign exchange earnings 
into the country would contract the output of the “lagging sector.”  In the case of the Philippines, 
manufactured exports have shrunk.
nn Innovation  and  exploitation  of backward and forward 
linkages has been sluggish with finishing-stage semiconductors and electronic equipment, which 
accounts for more than 60 percent of merchandise exports (ADB, 2007). Since manufactured 
exports serve as an engine of growth, economic development is adversely affected.  
If, as suspected, the lagging sector is more labor intensive than the booming sectors, 
downward pressure on wages and increasing unemployment may also result. This effect has been 
exacerbated by the high population growth in the Philippines. Outward migration serves as a 
safety valve, but higher skilled workers and entrepreneurs tend to leave the country, ergo the 
moniker, “brain-drain.” Unskilled workers, who tend to remain in the country, are more likely to 
live in poverty. 
In addition to the exchange rate appreciation and the possible subsequent contraction of 
other manufactured “exportables,” some of these booms increase the returns to rent-seeking, 
leading to the second curse. What really drove trade deficit between 1970 and 1980 was the 
chronic budget deficit that reached 4 percent of GDP in 1981. The root cause of this massive 
budget deficit was “crony capitalism” owing to substantial extraction of rents made possible by 
                                                 
jj After the 1974 oil price shock, the country ran huge current account deficits plummeting to 32% of its trade values 
(Bautista, 1988). 
kk Although interrupted by the onslaught of the 1997 Asian Crisis. 
ll The Act allows for up to 100% foreign equity participation in all investment areas. 
mm The year 2003 marked a significant jumpstart of services export, most notably BPO, in the Philippines. This 
made the country a major contender for offshore providers in the Asia-Pacific region next to India, China, and 
Malaysia (NeoIT 2004). The BPO sector accounted for 2.4% of GDP in 2005 and employed about 163,000 workers 
(Magtibay-Ramos, et. al 2008) 
nn The country has low manufacturing exports by regional standards. Growth in the period of 2000-2005 is only 
1.4% compared with 6.4% in Indonesia, 7.6% in Malaysia, and 11.8% in Thailand (ADB, 2007). 23 
 
an iron-triangle reinforced by a strong leader and limited accountability (Roumasset, 2009). The 
prevalence of rent-seeking activities and corruption inflated the budget deficit through increased 
external borrowing and misspending. Whether these foreign exchange earnings have indeed 
exerted upward pressure on the exchange rate remains disputable.
oo  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that these sectoral booms add another distortion to the 
Philippine economy, and they may have adverse general equilibrium effects on other sectors. 
Remittances may have invigorated consumption and growth, but without induced specialization, 
the resulting spending may not have the desirable network and other growth externalities. In the 
current decade, remittances have been increasingly channeled into investments in real estate 
partly because of the incentives created by the government through the Pag-Ibig Funds 
program.
pp  This allows for remittances to be an easy target for taxation or extortion. One 
example is when remittances are used for commercial construction wherein rents are shared 
between the housing developer and the minor bureaucrats. As for BPO, although it claimed to 
have generated employment, numerical simulation indicates that the sector has very low 
intersectoral linkages with the rest of the economy (Magtibay-Ramos, et al., 2008). Moreover, 
when transparency and accountability are absent, the blessing could turn into a curse because 
inefficiency in the system increases.   
Some caveats are in order. The above discussions focused on the possible adverse effects 
of foreign exchange earnings examined in the framework of Dutch disease. This is not to say, 
however, that we should get rid of these “blessings” any more than one would ban mining a new 
gold discovery. FDI, BPOs, and remittances may also generate growth externalities, though 
perhaps not at the same degree as manufactured exports. For example, FDI in banking and 
telecommunication, induced by deregulation in the 1990s, may have generated some innovations, 
spillover effects, and learning-by-doing. If the Philippines can follow the example of India, it 
may also be possible for institutions, human-capital, and knowledge provided by BPOs to create 
a comparative advantage in knowledge process outsourcing (KPO).
qq The provision of business 
and technical analysis, animation services, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and architectural 
                                                 
oo Tuaño-Amador et al. (2007) and Yue (2007) suspected that the strengthened peso is a symptom that the country 
has contracted the disease due to rise in remittances. Tan (2007) remains skeptical, pointing out that the 
performances of the manufacturing and agricultural sectors have been historically slow long before the surge of 
remittances and need not be explained by Dutch disease but by structural problems that plagued the sector. 
pp Pag-Ibig Fund Overseas Program for Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) pays 7% percent interest to any member 
of the family of an OFW. Workers can also avail of up to PhP 2 M for housing loans (PinoyBlogoSphere, 2009). 
qq See e.g. Outsource2India (2009). 24 
 
design may be similarly advantaged.
rr Similarly, overseas workers may return if and when the 
economy becomes sufficiently dynamic. These opportunities present policy challenges to 
facilitate warranted investments. Some general principles are explored in the next section. 
 
FROM VICIOUS TO VIRTUOUS CIRCLE  
The struggles of the Philippines do not portend permanent doom. In the words of J.R.R. Tolkien 
(1954): 
      All that is gold does not glitter; 
      all that is long does not last; 
      All that is old does not wither; 
      not all that is over is past.  
 
The Philippine case illustrates some of the inefficiencies associated with economic 
fragmentation. If these forces overcome the positive pull of total capital accumulation and 
dynamic efficiency, an economy can be trapped in a vicious circle of poverty, population 
pressure, and resource degradation.  
The original Brundtland concept demonstrated that sustainable development must allow 
for the interlinkages among poverty, population pressure and resource degradation. Figure 4 (left 
panel) depicts the interaction of population pressure and poverty as the notorious Malthusian 
vicious-circle and environmental degradation, which exacerbates that circle. Population growth, 
in the face of a limited resource base, exacerbates poverty by lowering the return to unskilled 
labor. This in turn prevents mechanisms whereby increased incomes and the rising productivity 
of human capital lower the demand for children. The population-poverty cycle is exacerbated as 
households with limited resource-access strive to eke out a living from environmentally fragile 
areas resulting in further environment degradation. The migration of labor to hillside agriculture 
may result in an increased importance of agriculture and natural resource in national income and 
employment (Balisacan and Rola, 2008). However, the end result is stagnation of per capita 
income, increased poverty, and deterioration of the natural resource base. Moreover, diminishing 
agricultural productivity growth, limited employment opportunities outside the agricultural 
                                                 
rr See e.g. Manila Bulletin (2005). 
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sector, high population growth, slow poverty reduction, and disfunctional institutions are major 
impediments to achieving sustained macroeconomic development. The conclusion reached by 
the Commission is that the problems could be addressed only if the three interacting forces in the 




  The right panel of Figure 4 shows the flipside of the vicious circle – the virtuous circle. 
The virtuous circle incorporates sustainable growth and patterns of sustainable development. The 
three pillars of sustainability, total environomy, dynamic efficiency, and intertemporal equity, 
support the virtuous circle of innovation, specialization, and increased social welfare. The double 
arrows of the circle represent the dual interactions between the three positive forces. Social 
welfare increases with higher per capita income, better health conditions, and improved 
education. These three stimulate demand for investment in children's human capital over sheer 
numbers, thereby reducing fertility and decreasing population pressure (Becker et al., 1990). 
What would it take to transform the vicious circle into a virtuous circle?  Orbiting into the 
virtuous circle is not an easy task.  Environmental degradation in rural areas is both a cause and 
effect of poverty. Unshackling the link requires sustained growth of employment opportunities in 
the general economy, making it attractive for the poor to move away from low-productivity 
annual crops on marginal, sloping lands into less erosive perennial crops (Balisacan and Rola, 
2008) and into the modern sector. A country must secure sources of productivity growth and 
income diversification through investments in R&D, irrigation, information, and education.  
The first requirement for transitioning from the vicious to the virtuous circle is the 
establishment of appropriate institutions. The New Institutional Economics and the new political 
economy (e.g. Acemoglu, 2005; Dixit, 1996; Coate and Morris, 1995; Besley, 2007; Rodrik 
2007) can be utilized to help understand the role of institutions in sustainable development.  
Good institutions are prerequisite for economic cooperation, especially for contracting and 
market development. The core economic principle from Adam Smith (1776) to Acemoglu (2005) 
has been that well-functioning competitive markets exploit comparative advantage as defined by 
its factor endowments, technology, market structure and transportation costs (Stolper and 26 
 
Samuelson, 1941; Jones and Scheinkman, 1977; and Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and 
transaction costs (Yang, 2003). 
But since factor endowments and other above features change over time, so does 
comparative advantage. Furthermore, it is endogenous due to the role of specialization and 
learning-by-doing (Yang, 2003). As comparative advantage changes, new investments become 
profitable; but these are interdependent, involving both supply and demand-side linkages 
(Stiglitz, 1993). To exploit these interdependencies, mechanisms for investment coordination are 
needed that go beyond the basic institutions of property, contracts, and markets.
ss  The 
government can either facilitate agreements between private groups and between the private and 
public sectors that coordinate investments (Roumasset and Barr, 1992) or give "prizes" such as 
preferential financing for high-performing exporters (World Bank, 1993 and Stiglitz, 1993).  
Getting the right institutions is a prerequisite but not a sufficient condition for 
development because of the presence of externalities. An example is illustrated in Bukidnon, 
Philippines wherein policy and institutional initiatives evolved from centralized to decentralized 
forest ownership and management. Forest clearing has been prevented but because agricultural 
intensification persists, soil erosion continued, soil fertility declined, and water resources were 
further degraded (Rola and Coxhead, 2005). To correct for these, going beyond the market is 
required in order to adjust the prices. Thus, the second condition is to get the prices right.  
Inasmuch as good institutions stimulate growth due to specialization, getting the prices 
right accelerates growth. Right prices should allow not only for optimally changing relative 
prices between consumption, capital, and resources, but changing relative prices sbetween 
different consumption goods as the comparative advantage changes over time. Furthermore, the 
presence of externalities calls for corrective prices to bring us closer to optimal outcomes. To 
facilitate this, economists are increasingly viewing the economy and the environment as a single 
interlinked system with a unified valuation methodology (Hamilton and Clemens 1999, Dasgupta 
2007).  
The third condition for the endurance of the virtuous circle is for transparency and 
accountability to become more than buzz words.
tt Transparency includes information systems 
                                                 
ss Competitive futures markets could also coordinate investments, but they are not well-developed for most goods, 
even in developed countries. 
tt Possibly the most famous of world leaders to have called for transparency and accountability are Mikhail 
Gorbachev (Rhodes, 2007) and Barack Obama (Ambinder, 2009). 27 
 
that reveal what the government is doing, what the economic consequences are, what groups 
enjoy the benefits, and who bears the costs. For example, economic benefit-cost studies 
inevitably increase transparency. The justice system provides market accountability through the 
system of contract, tort, and property law, and a commercial code. With this legal support, 
producers and consumers are accountable to one another. Administrative accountability subjects 
government officials and programs to similar principles. User fees, benefit taxation, and 
constitutional limitations on excess deficit spending are examples (Roumasset, 1989). Similarly, 
bureaucrats can be held accountable to operational performance standards. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Sustainable development encompasses sustainable growth and dynamically efficient 
development patterns.  Sustainable growth is given a solid and operational framework by 
positive sustainability, which provides specific guidelines for the accumulation/depletion of 
produced and natural capital. Resource management and pricing is guided by the Pearce equation. 
Optimal extraction occurs where the marginal benefit from consuming the resource is equal to its 
marginal opportunity cost. Resource pricing, ecosystem payments, and non-market valuation of 
environmental resources should be guided by the sum of extraction, marginal user, and marginal 
externality costs. In some cases, however, it is not feasible to reach an internal optimum as 
described by the Pearce equation, because so doing would deplete the resource below some 
technical threshold or safe minimum standard (Chapter 2). In such cases, the shadow price of the 
resource is given by its marginal opportunity cost, but not the resource price. 
  Pursuit of sustainable development is the road less travelled. Many countries exhibit 
unsustainable development (Dasgupta, 2007). Others are growing the environomy, but with 
unnecessary departures from the ideals of dynamic efficiency and intergenerational equity 
(Roumasset, et al., 2007). The lesson learned from the Philippine illustration is that policy and 
governance, driven by rent-seeking, exacerbate natural fragmentation and retard economic 
development. In addition, foreign exchange earnings from foreign aid, foreign direct investments, 
remittances, and tourism can promulgate a resource curse – causing a further drag on 
manufactured exports, the engine of growth in developing Asian countries, and increasing the 
returns to rent-seeking. Rent-seeking further aggravates economic fragmentation. The resulting 28 
 
low rate of economic growth exacerbates population pressure and environmental degradation, 
leading to a vicious circle of unsustainable development.    
An economy can escape from the vicious circle and transition into a virtuous circle by 
incorporating the principles of sustainable growth and development. For sustainable 
development not to be at odds with policy science, positive sustainability must be combined with 
efficient sectoral development and poverty reduction. The key is cultivating an economic 
environment that is conducive to specialization and innovation. These, plus productive and 
human capital formation and the efficient conservation of natural resources are all part of 
sustainable development policy. Government policies should be framed by the principles of 
positive sustainability – dynamic efficiency and capital formation that allow for standards-of-
living to perpetually increase, eventually approaching a golden-rule state wherein per capita 
welfare increases at the rate of technical change. 
The role of public policy in sustainable development is gleaned from the oldest lesson in 
economics – facilitate, don't dictate  (Smith, 1776).  Rent-seeking stifles innovation through 
fragmentation and stagnation. Transparency and accountability are the enemies of rent-seeking. 
A systems approach that takes into account the environomy, combined with dynamic efficiency 
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